Looks a bit like nostr except:
- data is named, not content addressed (to support overwrite & deletion), so the primitive data type is associative arrays of names to documents instead of sets of messages
- documents are grouped into "shares" and you have to know the "share address" before the server will acknowledge that it indeed has documents in that share.
Seems like an interesting approach: part way private, part way open. It think projects like this which pick an extreme on that axis end up suffering for it--which is most of them.
I bet it would succeed at keeping the spammers and scammers out, but I'd be leery of using it with a large group against a motivated adversary--if a single user exposes the share address (which is in a gray area between public and private) it seems like all of the users of that share are exposed. I'd prefer to see a web of trust so that an adversary has to compromise each hop on the trust graph before they find their target--but that's a lot of complexity for users to handle so I can see why keeping it simple might be worth tolerating the lack of granularity.
I certainly hope that something like this succeeds. It feels like we've lost the web and there are too many of us to coordinate en masse without something web-like--and at a time where that coordination is pretty important.
Hmm, a proper capability-based design would, of course, give each user a separate share address, which could be disabled at any time.
Share addresses should be handled much like ssh keys.
I haven't used this, just explored the docs a bit, so maybe I'm misunderstanding, but my feeling is that one-share-per-user is too small--you could only use that to chat with yourself.